We consider a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth with creative destruction in which we introduce a non-renewable natural resource. We characterize the optimum and the equilibrium paths, and we derive the precise levels of economic policy instruments that allow the implementation of the optimum. Moreover, we study the effects of these policies on the relevant steady-state variables, in particular the rate of extraction of the resource.
Introduction
It may seem paradoxical to ask whether positive infinite growth is possible despite the fact that the production process uses non-renewable natural resources. For several decades, this question has given birth to an important economic literature, most notably in growth theory. This literature has established that under some properties of the resource and some technological characteristics, positive long-run growth is possible even if the stock of the natural resource is finite.
In fact, many questions can be addressed and the following ones seem especially relevant to us:
• Is continuous growth compatible with a finite stock of natural resources ?
• What is the optimal path, and what are its properties ? In particular, even if positive growth is possible, is it optimal ?
• What are the properties of the equilibrium path ? Is it optimal ? If not, are there economic policies that allow the implementation of the optimum ? More generally, what are the effects of these policies ?
In the 1970s, Dasgupta and Heal (1974) , , Stiglitz (1974) , and Garg and Sweeney (1978) , among others, analyzed the problem in "standard" growth models ("à la Ramsey"). They showed that under certain technological conditions, positive long-run growth is possible in the presence of non-renewable natural resources. Moreover, they studied the optimal and the equilibrium paths. More recently, this analysis was relaunched within the context of endogenous growth models. In this new framework, the first-order conditions that characterize the optimum are, in some cases, not fulfilled at equilibrium, essentially because of the intertemporal externalities arising from the fact that knowledge is a public good. Indeed, if Barbier (1999) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) focus mainly on optimality aspects, and Scholz and Ziemes (1999) on equilibrium, Schou (1996) and Grimaud (2000) make use of a model of horizontal innovations to show that while positive optimal long-run growth is possible, the equilibrium path is not optimal.
In this paper, we use a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth (i.e., with vertical innovations) "à la Aghion-Howitt (1992) " to tackle this problem which has generally been done with "à la Romer (1990) " models and raise the same questions as above. In fact, our results partly resemble those obtained by authors working with "standard" growth models (e.g., Stiglitz (1974) , and Garg and Sweeney (1978) ), but we also find noticeable differences that raise new questions that we investigate. Moreover, we employ a very simple framework (in particular, we assume that there is a single intermediate good) so as to avoid computational complexity and to highlight the relevant phenomena.
In our model, the natural resource is necessary but non-essential (as defined by Dasgupta and Heal (1979) ), and a positive long-run growth is always possible if the R&D sector is productive enough. However, we find that this positive long-run growth may be non-optimal, because the optimum could also be characterized by a negative growth of output. As in Schou's (1996) paper, we show that, at equilibrium, growth (which can be positive or negative) is not optimal. However, contrary to Schou who finds that growth is under-optimal, we show that it may be either under or over-optimal. We then demonstrate that there exist economic policy tools that allow the implementation of the optimum and we compute the precise levels of these tools that equate both paths. We also perform some comparative statics exercises to analyze how the relevant variables of the model, in particular, the rate of extraction of the resource, are affected by these policy tools. Throughout the paper, we focus on optimum and equilibrium along the balanced growth paths only, i.e., on paths along which the growth rate of any variable is constant.
The remainder of the paper is organized in five sections. In section 2, we present the model. We characterize the optimum in section 3, and the equilibrium in section 4. In the latter section, we also compare the optimum and the equilibrium and we analyze the impact of the economic policy tools on the relevant variables. Section 5 is devoted to the implementation of the optimum by means of these tools. A summary and some concluding remarks are given in section 6.
The model
There are four goods in the economy: an homogeneous good (Y ) used only for consumption (c), an intermediate good (x), labor (L) and a non-renewable resource (R).
At each date t, the final output is produced by a competitive sector according to
where x t and R t are the amounts of intermediate good and resource used to produce Y t , and A t is the level of technology at time t : see (3) below.
Concerning the intermediate good sector, we use the Aghion-Howitt approach (see Aghion-Howitt (1998) , chapter 2). We assume that the labor supply is fixed and has two competing uses. First, it can produce the intermediate good, one for one. Second, it can be used for research. Normalizing the total flow of labor to one (L = 1), we have, at each time t :
where x t is the amount of labor used in manufacturing (recall that, as in Aghion and Howitt, due to the one for one technology, x t is also the amount of intermediate good) and n t is the amount of labor used for research.
If one unit of labor is used for research, innovations arrive randomly with a Poisson arrival rate λ > 0. Each innovation τ replaces the old one τ − 1 (τ is an index for innovations), and is such that
An innovation consists in a new technology that is embodied inside a new kind of intermediate good. This new intermediate good will then be produced by a monopoly and sold to the final sector until replaced by a new good (when the next innovation occurs). Following Aghion and Howitt, we assume that the amount of labor used for research is determined by an arbitrage condition which states that the wage (i.e., the cost of one unit of labor) is equal to the expected value of this unit used for research.
If we denote by S 0 the initial stock of resource, the stock at t is given by
and we assume that there are no extraction costs.
Starting from equation (1), we have g Y = g A + (1 − α)g R (where g z =ż z is the growth rate of any variable z). Assume that we are at steady-state ; the resource constraint The utility function of the infinitely lived representative agent is
where ρ is a positive rate of time preference and 1/ε is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Welfare analysis
This section essentially tackles two objectives. First, we set out to obtain a characterization of balanced optimal growth path. Second, we study the impact of parameter variations on this path, and we compare our results with those of more standard "exogenous growth models" (e.g. Stiglitz (1976) and Garg and Sweeney (1978) ).
In a first step, it is useful to observe that, on average, the law of motion of A t isȦ
Indeed, if n t is the quantity of labor devoted to research at t, then the expected level of the random variable A at t + ∆t is
that yields (6) when ∆t tends to zero.
We are now ready to characterize the optimal path.
Existence and characterization of the steady-state optimum
The program of the social planner is to maximize the utility
Proposition 1 A balanced optimal growth path is a set of quantities and growth rates that take the following values
The (unique) transversality condition is
This condition ensures that n o < 1. In order to have
First of all, observe that, since ε is positive, the transversality condition is equivalent to g
A second remark is that when the tranversality condtion holds, the integral in the stock constraint (4) is convergent. Then, since the resource stock is exhausted along an optimal path, we obtain
. That is, along the optimal path, the level of technological knowledge in the economy grows faster than output.
Fourth, observe from (10) that growth is positive if and only if λ(γ − 1) − ρ ≥ 0, and thus 1 − ρ/λ(γ − 1) ≥ 0 : along an optimal path, output grows if and only if the effectiveness of the R&D sector is greater than the psychological discount rate. Hence, an optimal negative growth of output is possible : we confirm, in an endogenous growth framework, the opinion of Solow (1974-a) who said : "even when the technology and the resource base could permit a plateau level of consumption per head, or even a rising standard of living, positive social time preference might in effect lead society to prefer eventual extinction, given the drag exercised by exhaustible resources".
We can gather these remarks as follows. If ρ < λ(γ − 1), we have
. In this case, we know that g o Y > 0. The transversality condition is satisfied only if
, and thus (1 − ε)λ(γ − 1) > ρ : in other words, the transversality condition is always satisfied and n o < 1. Finally, n o is positive only if ε >
In this case, the optimal rate of growth is negative because the effectiveness of the R&D sector (λ(γ − 1)) is lower than the psychological discount rate (ρ).
These results are summarized in Figure 1 .
Optimum exists only if
Optimum exists only if
Figure 1: Existence of interior optimum
Remark : if ρ > λ(γ − 1), and ε tends to
This is the case where we have the quickest decay.
Proof 1 The current value Hamiltonian of the program presented above is
where µ t and ν t are the costate variables.
The first order conditions ∂H/∂n t = 0 and ∂H/∂R t = 0 yield
and
Moreover, ∂H/∂A t = ρµ t −μ t and ∂H/∂S t = ρν t −ν t yield
At steady state, all variables grow at constant rates. Thus g From (13), we obtain
Then, using (15), we have
From (14), we obtain
Using (16), we have
Eliminating g o R between (17) and (18) gives, after some calculations,
that is, the value given by (7) .
From this result, all growth rates (9) - (10) - (11) can be easily computed.
Using (13), (15) and the fact that g
This inequality comes from n o < 1 and thus, using (7), (1 − ε)λ(γ − 1) < ρ (see (12) ).
Using (11) and (16) 
Properties of the steady-state optimal path
Our objective is now to present some properties of the optimal path and to compare them with (more standard) properties that have been obtained in "exogenous growth models". For instance, Stiglitz (1974) uses the Cobb-
where η is the rate of technological progress (Garg and Sweeney (1978) use the same technology).
The main results are stated in Table 1 increases (see (6) ). The social planner will thus choose a higher growth of output; yet, if the elasticity of marginal utility, ε, is higher than one (which means that consumers derive relatively more utility from a uniform path of consumption and thus of output), then a smaller growth rate of the resource extraction will soften the increase of g
This explains our result in the last line of Table 1 :
In Stiglitz (1974) (see p.134), it is shown that the sensitivity of this rate with respect to the rate of technological progress η depends on the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ε : ∂(R o /S o )/∂η is positive (resp. negative) if ε is higher (resp. lower) than one. The present model confirms these results.
• An increase in ρ means that households obtain more utility from current consumption relative to future consumption. Then, investment in R&D, which implies a sacrifice today for the sake of future gains, does not interest them. As a result, n o must decrease, and by consequence g o A will do so, too. Moreover, a higher ρ means a lower growth of consumption, because consumers prefer present consumption, and thus lower output growth. Then, g o R will also decrease, because the social planner, in order to produce more today, will extract the resource with less care for its future exhaustion.
• An increase in ε means that the elasticity of marginal utility increases :
households will derive more utility from a uniform consumption path, ceteris paribus. If g o Y > 0, then a social planner will not invest in R&D (investing would imply a higher consumption tomorrow) and thus n o and g o A will decrease. At the same time, he will choose a lower consumption growth rate (i.e., output growth rate) to achieve a flatter path, and therefore a lower growth rate of the resource extraction. If g o Y < 0, the opposite results stem from the same fact : the planner tries to flatten the consumption path, and thus lowers g
; our result is similar. Recall that, in both models, conditions η/α 3 ≥ ρ and λ(γ − 1) ≥ ρ are necessary and sufficient for the economy to grow at a positive rate.
Equilibrium

Existence and characterization of the steady-state equilibrium
Basic assumptions and behavior of agents
The price of good Y is normalized to one and w t , p t , p R t and r t are, respectively, the wage, the price of the intermediate good, the price of the resource and the interest rate on a perfect financial market. In order to eliminate the two market failures arising from the monopolistic character of the intermediate-good sector and from the intertemporal spillover, we use two public tools : a research subsidy (σ) and a demand subsidy for the intermediate good (θ). We now examine the behavior of the different agents. a) At each time t, the profit in the final sector is
Differentiating with respect to x t and R t and equating to zero gives the two following first order conditions :
b) In the intermediate good sector, the monopoly at time t maximizes the profit π m t = p t x t − w t x t where the demand function is given by (19) . This maximization yields
or, equivalently,
Now, let us look at the R&D side.
Assume that an innovation occurs at t. (r u + λn u )du). Thus, the value of an innovation at t, that is, the sum of the present values of expected profits, is
At t, the cost of one unit of labor per unit of time is w t (1 − σ t ). Simultaneously, the probability of an innovation is λ, that gives the expected pay-off λV t . Hence, the arbitrage condition is (see for instance AghionHowitt (1998), chapter 2)
c) On the competitive natural resource market, the maximization of the profit function
As usual, the transversality condition of this problem is
that is, an asymptotic exhaustion of the resource stock.
d) The government's budget constraint is
where T t is a lump-sum tax used to finance the research subsidy (σ t w t n t ) and the subsidy for the intermediate good (θ t p t x t ). θ t and σ t are chosen by the government in order to maximize welfare (see section 5 and proposition 6 below). The choice of any profile (T t ) +∞ t=0 simultaneously determines the profile of government borrowings, so that the government's budget constraint is satisfied at each time t. e) Finally, the representative household maximizes the utility function
where B t is the stock of bonds at t.
At each time t, the research sector borrows w t (1 − σ t )n t =Ḃ t from households on the financial market. Once one innovation has occured, the monopolist uses its profits π 
we obtain exactly w t (1 − σ t )n t , that is, the research sector's borrowings.
The above maximization leads to the usual condition :
Computation of the equilibrium
Until now we used time subscripts for the two subsidies θ and σ ; indeed we do not see any reason why they would not be time dependent outside the steady-state. Henceforth, we drop time subscripts for these two variables since, as we said before, we only study optimum and equilibrium at steadystate and similar studies (for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)) show that these tools are constant in this case. In Proposition 2, we show that with θ and σ constant, we can characterize the steady-state equilibrium paths (we use the symbol e for equilibrium, except for prices, that do not appear at optimum).
Proposition 2 A balanced equilibrium growth path is a set of quantities, prices and rates of growth that take the following values :
Quantities : 
Rates of growth : 1 − α) ), that is, formulas (40) and (38) in proposition 2. Now our objective is to compute n e . We start from the arbitrage condition (24) : w t (1 − σ) = λV t , in which V t is given by (23). In order to calculate V t , we first observe that r and n e are constant at the steady-state. Second, we have to calculate the profit π m t = p t x t − w t x t in the intermediate good sector. Since p t = w t /α (see (22) ) and using the expression of x t given by (21), we have
where we haveπ
. In fact, we introduce these two variables because they are constant at the steady-state. The free entry condition, w t (1 − σ) = λV t , can be writteñ
where A s = γA t , ∀s > t, because there is an innovation at time t (see(3)), and where R s = R t e g e R s at the steady state. After integration and simplification, we obtaiñ
From (21), we have 
Now, using (33) for r and (40) for g e R , we obtain the expression of n e given by (28).
Remark : observe that the rate of subsidy θ does not appear in quantities (in particular in n e ), in prices, nor in growth rates at steady-state (see proposition 2). In fact, we impose this subsidy in order to eliminate the distorsion due to the monopoly status of the intermediate firm. Nevertheless, we see that this subsidy does not modify the equilibrium values, because it affects p and w the same : both effects compensate each other. Thus, one instrument is enough to implement the optimum.
Existence of the steady-state equilibrium
In this section, we assume that there is no public intervention. Thus, we assume σ = 0 in proposition 2. We then obtain results that closely resemble those obtained at the optimum (see 3.1 and 3.2 above).
First, if σ = 0 in (28), we obtain, after some calculations,
Then, we can see that n e < 1 is equivalent to
if and only if ε > α(ρ/(λγ(1 − α)) − 1)/(1 − α).
Secondly, using (44) and (40), we calculate the rate of growth of the flow of extraction (which is equal to the rate of growth of the stock of resource at the steady-state) :
From (45) (1 − α) ). Thirdly, using (44) and (33), we find the interest rate without intervention
Now, using (46) and (38), we obtain the rate of growth without intervention
Then, from (47), we observe that growth is positive if and only if ρ < λγ(γ − 1)(1 − α)/(γ − α). Thus, we have two possible cases : − 1)(1 − α) ), and we have 0 < n e < 1 and g These results are summarized in Figure 2 , which can be likened to Figure  1 above.
Equilibrium exists only if
Equilibrium exists only if (see (38) ). This is the case where we have the quickest decay at equilibrium.
Properties of the steady-state equilibrium path
As done for the optimum (3.2), the impact of variations of different parameters of the model on n e , r and on the rates of growth g Table 2 . The results depicted in Table 2 closely resemble those obtained at the optimum: see Table 1 . Recall that the latter table presented the effects of parameter variations arising from the social planner's decisions. In Table 2 , the effects of the same parameter variations are shown, only this time they result from market mechanisms.
• An increase in λ or γ means that the R&D sector becomes more productive, inducing R&D firms to hire more workers. Because of the intertemporal externality on knowledge accumulation (see (39)), the rate of growth of knowledge, g e A , will also increase. In the meantime, more research will make the growth rate of output, g e Y , higher. Indeed, more research in the R&D sector implies that R&D firms will borrow more, and consequently, that the interest rate, r, will increase. For consumers, a higher interest rate means a higher growth rate of consumption, and thus a higher g e Y (see (38)). Moreover, we know (see (38) and (40)) that the resource extraction growth rate, g e R , is equal to the difference between the wage growth rate, g w , and the resource price growth rate, g p R ; that is, g e R is equal to the growth rate of the relative price between labor and resource (w/p R ). In fact, g w is equal to (r − ρ)/ε (see (38)), and g p R to r (see (41)) : this is the Hotelling rule. Thus, if the elasticity of marginal utility, ε, is higher than one, g w will be less sensitive to an increase in r than g p R . Then, if ε > 1 (resp. < 1), and if λ or γ increases, g w will increase less (resp. more) than g p R , which is why g e R will decrease (resp. increase). In other words, when the productivity of the R&D sector increases, the resource price increases relative to the wage.
• An increase in ρ means a higher taste for present consumption (relative to the future). In this case, the representative household will lend less because it prefers to consume today, and thus r will increase. Therefore, investment in R&D, n e , will decrease, and so will g e A . The increase in ρ will, however, dominate the increase in r in (38), and g e Y will decrease. Indeed, consumers derive more utility from present consumption, thus they have no interest in increasing g • When g e Y > 0, the effects of an increase in ε closely resemble those obtained above for an increase in ρ. A higher ε means that consumers are more interested in a uniform path of consumption : thus, they will lend less (have less interest in future gains) ans r will increase. Then n e and g e A will decrease. There are two opposite effects on g e Y (see (38)): an increase in r and an increase in ε, but it is the latter that dominates the former. Consumers prefer a more uniform consumption path : g e c (= g e Y ) decreases. At the end, the effect on g e R is unambiguous (as for the previous case): g e R decreases when ε grows because g w will decrease while g p R will increase; that is, the resource price will increase faster than the wage if the elasticity of marginal utility takes higher values.
Comparison between optimum and equilibrium
Here, we continue to assume that there is no public intervention (σ = 0) at equilibrium. Before making a comparison between optimum and equilibrium, it is useful to define the range of parameters in which this comparison is possible. This is done in the following proposition :
Proposition 3 Let us consider interior solutions only. An optimal path and an equilibrium path both exist in the following cases :
,
Proof 3
In order to prove the proposition, it suffices to recall Figures 1 and 2, and to observe that
Case a) An optimum path exists if ε > 1 − ρ/λ(γ − 1) and an equilibrium path exists if (1 − α) . Thus, the result follows.
Case b) An optimum path exists if
, except when γ > 1 α . The result follows.
Case c) An optimum path exists if
follows. Now, we consider the cases in which the two paths exist and we make a comparison in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 We have
, except in the following case : If γ > 1/α, we have 0 
Remark : in the last case, we have g
2 , which is exactly the condition that gives n o > n e . Then, we can proceed in exactly the same manner and obtain the same result :
2 ), where we have g
Let us make some comments on proposition 4. Clearly, the steady-state path is not optimal. In fact, we distinguish two cases : in the first one, we have n o > n e and g o Y > g e Y (in other words, there is not enough labor in research and development at equilibrium, and thus not enough growth). Moreover, if ε > 1 (resp. < 1), then Fig 3. Observe that the same result has been obtained by Schou (1996) Benassy (1998) .
Remark : we have just seen that in the particular case where ρ > λ(γ − 1), γ < 1/α and ε < ρ − λ(γ − 1)
if ε < 1 (resp. ε > 1). We can interpret this result by underlining that it occurs when the technology parameter γ is low, that is, when γ < 1/α. Then, we can see that the combination of the "business stealing effect", and the positive externality due to R&D (both described by Aghion and Howitt (1998) ) results in a domination of the former. Let us illustrate this by focusing on the extreme case when γ tends to 1, that is, when the size of the technological step due to a new invention is nil. In this case (see (6)), we clearly see that the positive external effect of R&D becomes null. On the contrary, at equilibrium, people will still work in the R&D sector, because V t (the discounted pay off to the next innovation) stays positive at steady-state. Thus the "business stealing effect" remains positive in this case, and dominates the positive externality. That is why we have n e > n o . 
Effects of public policies on equilibrium
In the two preceeding sections, 4.2 and 4.3, where we have assumed that there was no public intervention, we saw that, in general, an equilibrium is not optimal. We now study the effects of the rate of subsidy σ on the steady-state variables at equilibrium. 1)(1 − α) . But, it can be verified that in this case If ε = 1, the two effects compensate each other and we always have R e /S e = ρ. If ε < 1, the effect on g e Y is higher than the effect on g p R . Thus, the extraction rate R e /S e decreases. If ε > 1, the inverse result obtains : R e /S e increases. These results are summarized in Fig 5 and Fig 6, where we represent the trajectories of the pair (R e /S e , g e Y ) between point E (equilibrium without public intervention) and point O (optimum) when σ progressively increases from zero to its optimal value.
Proposition 5 n
Let us observe that these results are alike the ones obtained by Stiglitz (1974) and that we have here found again at the optimum (see 3.2 above). At equilibrium, an increase in σ has the same effects as a positive shock on technological progress, equivalent to an increase in Stiglitz's η, or an increase in λ or γ in our endogenous growth model. 
Implementation of optimum
Let us now calculate the optimal σ that leads to an optimal equilibrium path.
Proposition 6 If
, then the equilibrium path is optimal.
Proof 6
We are searching σ such as n o (see (7)) and n e (see (28)) be equal. Simple computations allow us to find σ.
Remark : as we said above, θ does not intervene in a policy aimed at the implementation of the optimum.
The analysis of the sign of σ shows that σ > 0 when n o > n e , and that σ < 0 when n o < n e . These results were predictable. We have just seen (proposition 5) that n e and g e Y are increasing functions of σ, and that ∂g e R /∂σ > 0 (resp. < 0) for ε < 1 (resp. > 1) ; clearly then, when n o > n e , g for ε < 1 (resp. ε > 1), without any economic policy, then σ will be positive. Indeed, a subvention on the wage paid to workers in the R&D sector will conduce R&D firms to hire more of them, and thus to perform more research. if ε < 1 (resp. ε > 1), of course, σ will be negative. The reverse occurs: a tax on the wage paid to R&D workers will induce the firm to hire less workers, thus n e and g e Y will decrease and approach their optimal values. We could probably have the same in Aghion-Howitt (1998) chapter 5, if we interpret their model as a vertical innovations model.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered a simple endogenous growth model with creative destruction. First, we studied the optimal steady-state growth path ; more specifically, we gave the conditions under which growth is positive along this path. Our aim was also to analyze the steady-state equilibrium. In particular, we characterized the economic policies necessary to implement the optimum.
We showed that, at the steady-state, both optimal and equilibrium growth can be either positive or negative, depending on the value of the psychological discount rate of the economy, relative to the values of the R&D technology parameters. We also proved that the equilibrium growth path is not optimal. In fact, we distinguished between two cases. In the first one, equilibrium growth is under-optimal, and the equilibrium resource extraction growth rate is under (over) optimal if the elasticity of marginal utility is lower (higher) than one; this case corresponds to the results established by Schou (1996) . But we found a second case in which we obtained the opposite result, i.e., equilibrium growth is over-optimal and so is the extraction growth rate if the elasticity of marginal utility is smaller than one.
Next, we proposed an economic policy which allows the implementation of the optimum. We showed that in the first case mentioned above, it corresponds to a subsidy for the wage paid to R&D workers; moreover, an increase in this subsidy will make the equilibrium growth rate of resource extraction higher or lower, depending, once again, on whether the elasticity of marginal utility is higher or lower than one. In the second case (over-optimal equilibrium growth), economic policy consists in a tax on the R&D wage (here, the effect on the resource extraction growth rate depends also on the elasticity of marginal utility).
Finally, we showed that increasing the subsidy (or tax) has the same effects on the steady-state equilibrium variables as an increase of the technical progress parameters in Stiglitz (1974) . Further research could, for instance, study the transitional dynamics of the model. Several other extensions are also possible. For instance, we could extend our analysis to frameworks that take capital into account, or generalize our model by considering a continuum of intermediate goods, instead of only one (see for instance Aghion-Howitt, chapter 5, for an analysis of the optimum in this case).
